



Exploring the interactions among external reference price, social visibility and purchase 
motivation in pay-what-you-want pricing 
Purpose – This paper investigates the direct and indirect effects of social visibility (private vs. 
public), purchase motivation (intrinsic vs. extrinsic vs. altruistic) and external reference price 
(absent vs. present) on consumers’ pricing decisions in pay-what-you-want (PWYW) context. 
Design/methodology/approach – Two empirical studies with a fitness gym as the research 
setting were used to test all the hypotheses; first, a lab experiment with undergraduate student 
participants and the second, an online experiment with a consumer panel. 
Findings – Both studies show that consumers allocate a higher share (RATIO) of their internal 
reference prices (IRP) to the prices to be paid (PTP) in PWYW context, in private under intrinsic 
purchase motivation and in public under extrinsic or altruistic motivation; and this effect is more 
pronounced in the absence of external reference price (ERP). 
Research limitations/implications – Future research may validate and extend our findings with 
other product or service categories, different manipulations for the key variables, other research 
methods such as field experiments and expand our model by including other relevant variables. 
Practical implications – Our findings will help managers understand how individual customers’ 
purchase motivation and the social visibility in the PWYW setting affect their pricing decisions 
and how providing external pricing cues may moderate these effects. 
Originality/value – Prior research on PWYW shows mixed findings about the direct effects of 
many variables on consumers’ pricing decisions but it ignores the differences in consumers’ 
purchase motivations and offers mixed evidence about the influence of social visibility and 
external reference prices on payment decisions. We address all these gaps in this paper. 
Keywords: External reference price, internal reference price, purchase motivation, social 
visibility, pay-what-you-want (PWYW), altruism, involvement, price consciousness  




Exploring the interactions among external reference price, social visibility and purchase 
motivation in pay-what-you-want pricing 
Introduction 
With growing competition in the marketplace, innovative pricing strategies can be an effective 
way to create differentiation in the minds of consumers (Kim et al., 2009). Hence, companies 
have tried various ‘participative’ pricing mechanisms under which consumers may perceive to 
have more control over pricing decisions, which in turn may have a favorable impact on their 
purchase decisions (Chandran and Morwitz, 2005). Examples of such participative pricing 
strategies range from bidding models such as ‘Name Your Own Price’ (NYOP) (Chernev, 2003) 
and auctions (Dolan and Moon, 2000) to negotiated pricing (Dolan and Moon, 2000) and ‘Pay 
What You Want’ (PWYW) pricing (Gneezy et al., 2010; Gneezy et al., 2012; Kahsay and 
Samahita, 2015; Kim et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2014). 
PWYW is different from other participative pricing mechanisms as it has no minimum 
price set by the seller and the buyers can pay whatever price they want (including a price of zero) 
that the seller has to accept without being able to withdraw the offer; whereas other participative 
pricing mechanisms such as auctions, negotiation and Name Your Own Price (NYOP) involve a 
series of interactions and negotiations between the buyers and the sellers along with a threshold 
price set by the seller (Kim et al., 2009); and the seller has the right to withdraw the product 
offer if the buyer offers a price below the seller’s threshold price (Kim et al., 2009).  
PWYW has drawn attention from marketing scholars (Gneezy et al., 2010; Gneezy et al., 
2012; Kim et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2014) albeit with many mixed results, 




pay (Gap 1). For example, Kim et al. (2009) found significant effects of each variable in their 
study (i.e., fairness, altruism, satisfaction, loyalty, price-consciousness, income, and reference 
price) on PWYW decisions, in only one of their three research settings (restaurant, cinema and 
delicatessen). Similarly, studies show either a positive (Kim et al., 2009), negative (Gneezy et 
al., 2012) or even no effect (Machado and Sinha, 2012) on the impact of social visibility (private 
vs. public) on PWYW pricing decisions. We address this gap with a new conceptual framework 
with ‘purchase motivation’ (intrinsic, extrinsic or altruistic) as a moderator of the process by 
which social visibility may influence consumers’ pricing decisions. We argue that consumers 
would be willing to pay more in PWYW context, under the influence of intrinsic motivation in 
private and extrinsic or altruistic motivation in public. 
Early PWYW research explored the role of internal reference prices (Kim et al., 2009) 
but recent studies also examined the role of external reference prices (ERP), albeit again with 
mixed results (Gap 2). For example, Kim et al. (2014) show a positive effect of ERP on prices 
paid by consumers and Schmidt et al. (2014) find a negative effect, whereas Johnson and Cui 
(2013) show both positive and negative effects for different types of ERP (minimum, maximum 
and suggested). As a result, it is not clear if using ERP will make consumers pay more or less 
and if this effect is contingent upon any other variables. We address this gap by proposing that 
ERP may actually play a more complex role than having a simple direct effect on PWYW prices, 
and instead it may interact with other variables such as social visibility (public vs. private) and 
consumers’ purchase motivation (intrinsic vs. extrinsic vs. altruistic). We posit that providing 
ERP would weaken the interactive effect of social visibility and purchase motivation on 




We tested and found support for most of our hypotheses with two studies, a lab 
experiment and an online experiment, both using a fitness gym context, which is different from 
the settings used in prior PWYW research. We extend current research on PWYW pricing and 
help resolve some inconclusive findings reported earlier (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2012; Kim et al., 
2014; Kim et al., 2009; Machado and Sinha, 2012), by looking beyond the direct effects of 
variables such as altruism, fairness, price consciousness and reference price, to introduce a more 
comprehensive model incorporating two-way and three-way interactions. In the process, we aim 
to help future researchers and businesses interested in this innovative pricing strategy. 
Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Pay what you want (PWYW) pricing 
PWYW pricing strategy has several benefits for the consumers and marketers (Kunter, 2015; 
Mendoza-Abarca and Mellema, 2015; Schmidt et al., 2014). First, it allows consumers to 
participate actively in the price-setting process giving them more perceived control, which in 
turn may lead to higher purchase intentions (Kim et al., 2009). Second, consumers may also have 
greater perceptions of fairness and satisfaction when they play an active role in the price setting 
process (Haws and Bearden, 2006). Third, PWYW allows for heterogeneous valuations and 
individually differentiated prices for the consumers (Spann and Tellis, 2006). Finally, PWYW 
pricing also allows the sellers to attract more buyers and serve consumer segments (e.g., price 
conscious) who would be otherwise priced out of the market (Kim et al., 2009). 
Although buyers can pay any range of price under PWYW (including zero), the 
successful implementation of this pricing mechanism in both online and offline situations shows 




predict. Specifically, standard economic theories posit that consumers would maximize their 
utility function by paying nothing; past research shows that they rarely do so (Bertini and 
Koenigsberg, 2014; Gneezy et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2009). Researchers explain this apparently 
irrational behavior by suggesting that consumers are also guided by social exchange norms and 
not just money-market relationships (Ariely et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2012; Kahsay and 
Samahita, 2015; Mendoza-Abarca and Mellema, 2015; Riener and Traxler, 2012).  
In money-market relationships, exchange between two parties is governed by the use of a 
value or utility metric while social-market relationships are guided by social exchange norms 
driven by considerations such as reciprocity, cooperation and distribution (Heyman and Ariely, 
2004). Consumers are generally unwilling to violate social norms as such actions may result in 
social disapproval and personal distress (Ariely et al., 2009). PWYW pricing invokes social 
exchange norms by dissolving typical money-market relationships as buyers are allowed to have 
maximum control over pricing decisions, which leads to many consumers paying a price higher 
than zero (Kim et al., 2009; Riener and Traxler, 2012). In this context, we next discuss the role 
of reference prices on consumers’ PWYW pricing decisions. 
Internal reference price (IRP) 
Internal reference price (IRP) is defined as a memory-resident price based on actual, fair, or 
other price concepts (Garbarino and Slonim, 2003), which the consumers use as an internal 
judgment scale to evaluate the prices offered to them (Mazumdar et al., 2005; Winer, 1986). 
Consumers may also draw on their memory for prices paid by them in the past for a similar 
product or service, when they are in a purchase environment (Mazumdar and Papatla, 2000). In 




decide the price they are willing to pay (Kim et al., 2009). For example, Kim et al. (2009) used a 
series of field experiments in different PWYW settings (restaurant, cinema and delicatessen) to 
show that buyers are willing to discharge a higher proportion of their internal reference price 
(IRP) to the seller in all the three settings. Similar results are reported by other researchers (e.g., 
Kahsay and Samahita, 2015; Roy, 2015), hence we use the ratio of prices to be paid and IRP 
(i.e., the allocation of internal reference price) as the dependent variable in this study. 
Social Visibility – Private vs. Public 
People like to be seen by others while doing good because they are concerned about what others 
may think about their observed behavior (Ariely et al., 2009). For example, people act more pro-
socially (i.e., donate more money) in public than in private during charitable fund-raising events 
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Soetevent, 2005). Consumers are also less price-sensitive and pay 
more in social settings than in private (Wakefield and Inman, 2003). In PWYW, Kim et al. 
(2009, p.47) show that social visibility (face-to-face interaction with the seller) makes consumers 
pay more than a price of zero because “most consumers will conform to social norms and may 
not want to appear cheap”. Others report similar results (e.g., Kunter, 2015; Mendoza-Abarca 
and Mellema, 2015; Riener and Traxler, 2012) based on which we hypothesize:  
H1:  Social visibility has a positive effect on the allocation of IRP to the prices to be 
paid (PTP) by the consumers in PWYW context, such that RATIO (PTP/IRP) is 
higher under public versus private settings. 
Purchase motivation – intrinsic, extrinsic and altruistic 
Early research identified two types of motivations that drive human behavior in a given situation; 




and physical appearance) motivations (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Under intrinsic motivation people 
focus on the task itself and on consequences external to the task such as receiving rewards or 
avoiding punishment, under extrinsic motivation. People are also more oriented towards 
interpersonal comparisons and pursuit of the right social image and status under extrinsic 
motivation (Kasser et al., 2004). In other words, extrinsic motives can motivate people to present 
themselves in line with popular social norms, which may even undermine their intrinsic motives. 
For example, giving external motivation in the form of rewards to undertake an intrinsically 
interesting activity can lead to less enjoyment (Deci, 1972). In the pricing context, consumers are 
also influenced by how they want to appear to themselves i.e. self-image (intrinsic) or to others 
i.e. social image (extrinsic) (Aronson and Aronson, 2007).  
Subsequent researchers introduced altruistic motivation as a construct distinct from the 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Altruism involves different types of non-egoistic motives and 
behaviours (Lynn and Oldenquist, 1986; cf. Rushton and Sorrentino, 1981) that may be linked to 
both intrinsic and extrinsic motive. For example, the ‘warm-glow’ altruism (Adreoni, 1990) 
parallels the notion of intrinsic satisfaction (De Young, 1996) whereas ‘paternalistic’ altruism 
(McConnell, 1997) arises when people are concerned about the satisfaction of others (Clark, 
Kotchen and Moore, 2003). There is mixed evidence about the origins of altruistic motivation 
and behaviour. For example, similar to intrinsic motivation, external rewards may undermine 
altruistic motivation to help others (Kunda and Schwartz, 1983), whereas others question the 
existence of pure altruism and claim that it is driven by ego needs or self-reward (Cialdini 1991; 
Crumpler and Grossman, 2008). Notwithstanding the origin of altruistic motivations, there is 
substantial evidence about their influence on peoples’ attitudes and behaviours towards 




approval, and thereby end up donating  more money in the process of doing so, especially in 
public than in private (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Soetevent, 2005). 
Interaction between social visibility and purchase motivation 
Recent research on the role of social motivations on PWYW pricing decisions shows mixed 
results. For example, Gneezy et al. (2012) found a negative effect of social visibility on the 
prices paid by the consumers in three different settings (theme park, tour boat and restaurant) 
wherein the consumers paid higher prices in private than in public, whereas Machado and Sinha 
(2012) did not find any effect of social visibility on PWYW prices. In this context, Gneezy et al. 
(2012) explain their findings by arguing that consumers may be more concerned about their self-
image rather than their social-image and hence, they would pay more to protect their self-image. 
In contrast, Machado and Sinha (2012) explain the lack of any significant difference simply as an 
artifact of the experimental setting because the payment was only visible to a lab assistant with 
whom most participants would not expect any future interactions. Interestingly, when they tested 
their model with only the non-zero payments from their sample, they did find a positive effect of 
payment visibility as shown by significantly lower payments in the private condition. We extend 
this line of research by proposing that consumers’ inherent purchase motivation (intrinsic, 
extrinsic or altruistic) may moderate the impact of social visibility on their PWYW decisions. 
In the case of consumers who are influenced by intrinsic motives, their personal values 
and self-image may drive the amount of money paid (Gneezy et al., 2012; Kahsay and Samahita, 
2015); whereas for those influenced by extrinsic motives, the presence of others around them and 
perceived social impact may play a greater role (Kim et al., 2009; Kunter, 2015; Mendoza-




personal goals such as self-image and adherence to personal values to a greater extent when they 
are alone (private) than with others (public); and more by social goals such as social-image and 
impression management in the company of others (public) than when they are alone (private). 
We further argue that the impact of altruistic motivation on PWYW pricing decisions 
would be stronger in public than in private. People with altruistic motives want to signal 
desirable image while making donations to charity, and may pay more money in public than in 
private (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Soetevent, 2005). Similarly, past research on PWYW shows 
that people may try to signal a positive image to others and pay more in public than in private 
(Gneezy et al., 2012). Due to the ability of altruistic behaviour in helping people make a good 
impression on others, altruistic motivation should have a stronger influence on PWYW pricing 
decisions in public than in private. Based on the above, we hypothesize as follows: 
H2:  Purchase motivation moderates the effect of social visibility on the allocation of 
IRP to the prices to be paid (PTP), such that PTP/IRP ratio is a) higher in private 
than in public under the influence of intrinsic motivation, and higher in public 
than in private under the influence of b) extrinsic, and c) altruistic motivations. 
External reference price (ERP) 
External reference prices (ERP) are based on the external stimuli in the purchase environment, 
such as suggested retail prices or regularly offered prices, and consumers use these along with 
IRP to make their purchase decisions (Mazumdar and Papatla, 2000). Early PWYW research 
focused on the impact of IRP on consumers’ pricing decision (e.g., Kim et al., 2009) but recent 
studies have explored the role of ERP albeit with inconclusive findings. For example, Kim et al. 




PWYW setting because ERP acts as a normative anchor influencing consumers to pay close to 
the posted price. In contrast, Schmidt et al. (2014) find that a posted price as ERP may reduce 
the buyers’ payments by acting as an upper bound on the PWYW payments.  
To further explore the role of ERP in PWYW pricing, Johnson and Cui (2013) evaluate 
three types of ERP strategies used by marketers to influence consumers' PWYW pricing 
decisions, namely minimum, maximum, and suggested prices. Interestingly, they also find mixed 
results, wherein both minimum and maximum prices as ERP show a negative impact on prices 
paid by the consumers, whereas suggested price helps maximize the firm's yield by allowing 
consumers to choose their own price, especially when the suggested price is close to the 
consumer's IRP. From such mixed findings, it is clear that there is a need to look deeper into the 
process by which ERP affects consumers’ pricing decisions in PWYW context. We address this 
need by looking beyond the direct effects of ERP on prices paid by the consumers in a PWYW 
setting and investigating the interaction of ERP with purchase motivation and social visibility, 
while controlling for various other variables including internal reference price.  
We argue that the hypothesized interaction between purchase motivation and social 
visibility (H2) would no longer hold when ERP is provided, for two reasons. First, when external 
price information is provided, consumers will have an objective anchor to help them make their 
pricing decision and they will no longer be driven by extrinsic factors such as impression 
management or intrinsic factors such as self-image or personal values. Second, having ERP as an 
external anchor will also help the consumers arrive at their pricing decision in a relatively more 
objective manner and reduce the impact of a subjective factor such as social visibility (private vs. 
public). Moreover, similar to the impact of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, we expect this 




absence of ERP than in its presence. This follows from our above argument that even altruistic 
behaviour can be driven by subjective factors such as image and social motives (Andreoni and 
Petrie, 2004; Soetevent, 2005) and such motives diminish when consumers rely on objective 
rather than subjective factors. Based on this reasoning, we put forth our final hypothesis: 
H3:  The two-way interaction between purchase motivation and social visibility would 
become non-significant when ERP is provided, such that the differences in the 
effects of a) intrinsic, b) extrinsic and c) altruistic motivations on PTP/IRP ratio in 
private versus public are stronger in the absence of ERP than in its presence. 
Figure I depicts all these hypotheses. Next we describe two studies (a lab experiment and 
an online experiment) used to test these hypotheses. In particular study 1 tests H1, H2a, H2b, 
H3a and H3b. Study 2 tests all the hypotheses (i.e., H1, H2a-c and H3a-c). 
< Insert Figure I about here > 
Study 1 – Lab Experiment 
Sample and procedure 
We used a 2 (purchase motivation: intrinsic, extrinsic) x 2 (social visibility: friends, alone) x 2 
(ERP: present, absent) mixed experimental design with the first two factors manipulated as 
between-subjects and the third factor as a within-subject variable. 124 students (65 females) 
participated in the lab experiment and were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental 
conditions. 89% of the respondents are in the age group of 19-30 years. Table I summarizes the 
sample characteristics for both the studies. 




All the participants completed a structured questionnaire with three parts. In the first part, 
the participants were asked to imagine that they were planning to join a fitness gym on the 
campus that had come up with a special one week PWYW offer. We then manipulated purchase 
motivation by asking participants to imagine that the reason for joining the gym was to improve 
their fitness (intrinsic) or to look good (extrinsic) for an upcoming bike trip. Next, we 
manipulated social visibility by asking the participants to imagine that while making payment at 
the gym they were either alone or with a group of friends. We then checked the manipulations by 
using adapted multiple-item scales for intrinsic/extrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000) and 
social visibility (Sharma, 2011). Finally, the participants recorded the price they would pay 
(PTP1) followed by their IRP (normal price for a similar offer). 
In the second part, participants were given the external reference price (ERP) by 
informing them that a similar one week trial was normally offered for AU$ 15. We finalized the 
ERP amount based on an informal survey of prices for similar offers at local gyms and a pretest 
with students from the same cohort. Next, the participants reported the price they would pay 
(PTP2) based on this new information. Finally, the participants completed the scales for price 
consciousness (Donthu and Gilliland, 1996), involvement (Sharma, 2011) and social desirability 
(Hays et al., 1989), followed by the demographic variables (age, gender and monthly expenses). 
Data analysis and results 
We began by testing the measurement model using Confirmatory Factor Analysis with AMOS 
22.0 and found a close fit (2 = 173.77, df = 122, 2/df = 1.42, NFI = .90, CFI = .96, RMSEA = 
.058 and SRMR = .056) with all the fit indices better than the recommended cut-off values. All 




expected latent constructs with no major cross-factor loadings. Average variance extracted 
(AVE) for all the scales (.54–.75) and the construct reliabilities (.76 – .94) are also quite high. 
Table II shows the descriptive statistics for all the scale items and Table III shows the 
correlations and psychometric properties for all the constructs.   
< Insert Tables II and III about here > 
We checked our manipulations using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with 
the average scores for social visibility and purchase motivations as dependent variables, the two 
experimental conditions (‘private vs. public’ and ‘intrinsic vs. extrinsic’) as the fixed factors and 
the control variables as covariates. We found significantly higher scores for the social visibility 
scale under public (M=4.57) versus private (M=3.72) conditions (F(1,123) =7.39, p < .01), for 
intrinsic motivation under intrinsic (M=5.89) versus extrinsic (M=4.73) conditions (F(1,123) 
=53.74, p < .001); and for extrinsic motivation under extrinsic (M=5.71) vs. intrinsic (M=4.68) 
conditions (F(1,123) =31.88, p < .001). Thus, both manipulations are successful. 
Next, as advised in extant literature (e.g., Kim et al., 2014), we created two ratios, 
RATIO1 (PTP1/IRP) and RATIO2 (PTP2 /IRP) by dividing the two ‘prices to be paid’ (PTP) 
measures by IRP, in order to control for IRP and to achieve comparability across the two PTP 
measures with and without ERP. We then used a three-way mixed ANOVA with RATIO1 and 
RATIO2 as within-subject dependent variables and the two manipulated variables (purchase 
motivation and social visibility) as between-subjects factors, to test all our hypotheses. We also 
included involvement, social desirability and price consciousness (and its interactions with all 
the manipulated variables) as covariates. Table IV and Figure II summarize these results. 




We first looked at the findings for the between-subjects factors and found no significant 
difference in RATIO1 under private (M=0.93) versus public (M=0.94) condition (F(1,89)=1.02, 
p > .31), thus H1 is not supported. Similarly, there is no significant difference in the value of 
RATIO1 (F(1,89)=0.42, p > .52) between intrinsic (M=0.89) and extrinsic (M=0.97) purchase 
motivation. Next, we found a significant two-way interaction between purchase motivation and 
social visibility (F(1,89)=6.089, p < 0.05), showing that in the absence of ERP, intrinsically 
motivated consumers allocate a higher proportion of their internal reference price in private 
(M=1.30) versus public (M=0.51) condition (H2a); whereas extrinsically motivated consumers 
are willing to allocate a higher proportion of their internal reference price in public (M=1.40) 
versus Private (M=0.59) condition (H2b). Hence, these findings support both H2a and H2b. 
Next, we checked the within-subject effects and found no significant main effect of 
RATIO (Wilk’s Lambda = 0.99, F (1,89)=0.56, p > 0.45) or its interactions with purchase 
motivation (Wilk’s Lambda = 1.00, F (1,89)=0.12, p > 0.66), social visibility (Wilk’s Lambda = 
0.99, F (1,89)=1.23, p > 0.27) and all the control variables. However, as expected, the three-way 
interaction among RATIO, purchase motivation and social visibility is significant (Wilk’s 
Lambda = 0.96, F (1,89)=4.12, p < 0.05), which means that in the presence of ERP there is no 
significant difference in the value of RATIO in private (M=0.62) versus public (M=0.59) under 
intrinsic motivation (H3a) although it is still higher in public (M=1.06) versus private (M=0.47) 
under extrinsic motivation (H3b). Hence, H3a is supported and H3b is not, but overall these 
findings show that the interaction between social visibility and purchase motivation becomes 
non-significant under the presence of ERP. Finally, among all the covariates, only price-
consciousness shows a positive effect (F(1,89)=4.06, p < .05) and there is no change in our 





In study one, we used a lab experiment in the context of a fitness gym on campus, to probe the 
direct and indirect effects of purchase motivation and social visibility on PWYW pricing 
decisions, while controlling for various individual characteristics used in past research (e.g., 
involvement, price consciousness and social desirability). As hypothesized, social visibility 
interacts with purchase motivation to influence payment decisions in the absence of ERP and this 
interaction disappears when ERP is provided to the consumers prior to making payments. This 
finding has important implications because it may help resolve the ambiguity in prior research 
about the role of ERP on consumers’ PWYW decision-making. Our results show that ERP may 
not directly influence prices paid by consumers but it may indirectly influence this process by 
interacting with other important variables such as social visibility and purchase motivation. 
Therefore, marketers should be careful about using ERPs in the form of regular prices or other 
external pricing cues because it may either decrease or increase the prices paid by consumers 
depending on whether they are intrinsically or extrinsically motivated and if they are alone or in 
company of others (which may affect their susceptibility to others’ influence).  
Notwithstanding the above useful insights, our first study has a few limitations. First, we 
used undergraduate students as participants with a fitness gym on campus as the PWYW setting 
that was found to be highly relevant to these students based on our pretest with a smaller group 
of students from the same cohort. However, our sample is relatively younger and has quite low 
disposable income; hence our findings may not be generalizable to the broader consumer 
population. Moreover, we did not collect information on the past membership and recent usage 




Second, we used a within-subject design to explore the impact of ERP on the interaction 
between social visibility and purchase motivation, which were manipulated between-subjects. As 
a result, we used a three-way mixed ANOVA to test the influence of ERP on our other variables 
and their interactions. However, it may be more rigorous to use a between-subjects design to 
manipulate the absence and presence of ERP to avoid any carry-over or demand effects. Third, 
we use two types of purchase motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic) in our first study but it would 
be useful to explore the impact of altruistic motivation on PWYW pricing decisions in view of 
unclear results on the role of altruism  reported in prior PWYW research (e.g., Kim et al., 2009). 
We address all these limitations in our second study by using an online experiment with a 
between-subjects design, again with a ‘fitness gym’ as the PWYW setting and ‘friends’ to 
manipulate the public condition in order to be consistent with our first study. We also collected 
past membership and usage frequency of a fitness gym and used these as control variables. 
Finally, we included an altruistic (i.e., charitable) purchase motivation in order to compare its 
impact with that of the other two motivations (intrinsic and extrinsic) included in our first study. 
Study 2 – Online Experiment 
Sample and procedure 
We used a 3 (purchase motivation: intrinsic, extrinsic, altruistic) x 2 (social visibility: friends, 
alone) x 2 (ERP: present, absent) between-subjects experimental design with 435 members of an 
Australian online consumer panel (197, 45% females) who were randomly assigned to one of the 
twelve experimental conditions. This sample is quite different from our first study as it has no 
students and all the respondents are above the age of 21 years, most (88%) have an income 




retired (14%), housewives (8%) or others (6%). More than half (53%) had a gym membership in 
the past and about half (52%) have never used a fitness gym. 
All the participants completed an online questionnaire similar to the one in study one. On 
the first screen, they read a scenario about a special one week PWYW offer from a fitness gym 
near their home under which they can pay any price they want (including a price of zero) and the 
gym promises to donate all their collections from this offer to a local charity. To manipulate the 
absence and presence of ERP, half the scenarios mentioned that a similar offer was available for 
AU$15 at other gyms whereas the other half of scenarios did not include any such information. 
We then manipulated social visibility by asking the participants to imagine that while making 
payment at the gym they were either alone or with a group of friends. Next, we manipulated 
purchase motivation by asking the participants to imagine one of these for joining the gym - to 
improve fitness and stamina for a healthy lifestyle (intrinsic), to improve physical appearance to 
impress friends (extrinsic) or to make a useful contribution to the society (altruistic).  
Next, we then checked the manipulations with the adapted scales for intrinsic, extrinsic 
and altruistic motivations (Ryan and Deci, 2000) and social visibility (Sharma, 2011). The 
participants then recorded the price they would pay (PTP) for the PWYW offer followed by their 
IRP (normal price for a similar offer at any other gym). Finally, the participants completed the 
price consciousness (Donthu and Gilliland, 1996), involvement (Sharma, 2011) and social 
desirability (Hays et al., 1989) scales, followed by the demographic variables (age, gender, 
income, occupation, past gym membership and current usage). 




We began by testing the measurement model using Confirmatory Factor Analysis with AMOS 
22.0 and found a close fit (2 = 393.37, df = 187, 2/df = 2.13, NFI = .96, CFI = .98, RMSEA = 
.051 and SRMR = .044) with all the fit indices better than the recommended cut-off values. All 
the parameter estimates are high (.71 – .95) and load significantly (p < .001) on their respective 
latent constructs as expected with no major cross-factor loadings. All the scales also show high 
average variance extracted (AVE) (.71 – .84) and the construct reliabilities (.90 – .97) are also 
quite high. Table V shows the descriptive statistics for all the scale items and Table VI shows the 
correlations and psychometric properties for all the constructs.   
< Insert Tables V and VI about here > 
We used multivariate analysis of variance to check our manipulations by comparing the 
average scores for social visibility and purchase motivation across the experimental conditions. 
We found significantly higher scores for social visibility in public (M=4.67) than in private 
(M=4.04) conditions (F(1,435)=16.36, p < .001); for intrinsic motivation under intrinsic 
(M=5.31) than in extrinsic (M=4.32) and altruistic (M=4.16) conditions (F(2,435)=20.80, p < 
.001); for extrinsic motivation under extrinsic (M=4.05) than in intrinsic (M=2.95) and altruistic 
(M=3.08) conditions (F(2,435)=18.61, p < .001); and for altruistic motivation under altruistic 
(M=5.30) than in intrinsic (M=4.13) and extrinsic (M=4.00) conditions (F(2,435)=26.41, p < 
.001). Based on these results, all the manipulations appear to be successful. 
We used a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test all the hypotheses because in 
this study we manipulated ERP, purchase motivation and social visibility as between-subjects 
factors. Hence, we calculated RATIO by dividing the price to be paid (PTP) by the internal 




variables (ERP, social visibility and purchase motivation) as the fixed factors, and involvement, 
social desirability and price consciousness (and its interactions with all the manipulated 
variables) as covariates, as in the first study. Table VII and Figure III summarize the results. 
< Insert Table VII and Figure III about here > 
We looked at the main effects of social visibility and purchase motivation by comparing 
the value of RATIO across the different conditions for these two variables. Once again we found 
no significant differences in the values of RATIO under private (M=0.95) and public (M=0.95) 
conditions (F(1,435)=0.001, p > .97), thus H1 is again not supported. Similarly, there is no 
significant difference in the values of RATIO between intrinsic (M=1.03), extrinsic (M=0.82) 
and altruistic (M=1.00) purchase motivations (F(2,435)=1.03, p > .36). We found a significant 
two-way interaction between purchase motivation and social visibility (F(2,435)=4.907, p < 
0.01) with a higher value of RATIO in private (M=1.36) than in public (M=0.72) under intrinsic 
motivation (H2a) but a higher value in public than in private for extrinsic (H2b: M=0.89 vs. 
0.74) and altruistic (H2c: M=1.23 vs. 0.77) motivations; hence H2a, H2b and H2c are supported.  
Next, the three-way interaction between ERP, purchase motivation and social visibility is 
also significant (F(2,435)=3.91, p < 0.05), with significantly greater difference in the value of 
RATIO in private and public under “ERP Absent” condition for intrinsic (H3a: 1.78-0.74 = 
1.04), extrinsic (H3b: 0.53-0.93 = -0.40) and altruistic (H3c: 0.68-1.72 = -1.04) motivations, 
compared to the “ERP present” condition for intrinsic (0.96-0.70 = 0.26), extrinsic (0.96-0.85 = 
0.11) and altruistic (0.85- 0.77 = 0.08) motivations. Hence, H3a, H3b and H3c are also 
supported. Finally, among all the covariates, only involvement shows a positive effect on RATIO 




General discussion  
Conceptual contribution 
We used two studies to explore the direct and indirect impacts of social visibility and purchase 
motivation on the allocation of IRP into prices to be paid by the consumers in the absence and 
presence of ERP in a PWYW context. Using a fitness gym setting in both our studies (one a lab 
experiment and the other an online experiment), as expected we did not find any direct effect of 
social visibility and purchase motivation but we did find the hypothesized interaction between 
these two manipulated variables as well as a three-way interaction with ERP. Specifically, we 
did not find any significant difference in the allocation of IRP between private and public or 
under the influence of different purchase motivations as such but consumers did allocate a 
greater proportion of their IRP in private under intrinsic motivation and in public under extrinsic 
and altruistic motivation. All these differences are more pronounced in the absence of ERP and 
weaker in the presence of ERP.  Overall, we provide useful insights into the socio-psychological 
mechanism underlying the consumer decision-making in PWYW context and make two main 
theoretical contributions. 
First, we address the inconsistency in the literature regarding how social visibility may 
influence PWYW prices. For example, Kim et al. (2009) show a positive effect of social 
visibility on PWYW prices, Gneezy et al. (2012) show a negative effect, whereas Machado and 
Sinha (2012) show no significant effect. Our findings resolve this conflict by showing that 
instead of having a direct effect, social visibility may interact with consumers’ purchase 




allocate their IRP to the prices they would pay. Thus, by studying the interaction between these 
variables, we address an important gap in the current research on PWYW pricing.  
Second, we extend recent research (Johnson and Cui, 2013; Kim et al., 2014; Schmidt et 
al., 2014) that present contrasting results about the role of ERP in PWYW context. For example, 
Kim et al. (2014) show a positive effect of ERP on prices paid by consumers and Schmidt et al. 
(2014) find a negative effect, whereas Johnson and Cui (2013) show both positive and negative 
effects for different types of ERP (minimum, maximum and suggested). We address these mixed 
results by hypothesizing a three-way interaction among ERP, purchase motivation and social 
visibility. We then show in both our studies that the social forces (as operationalized by the 
interaction between social visibility and purchase motivation) are only at play in the absence of 
objective pricing cues (in the form of ERP) and the effects of this interaction disappear when 
consumers are provided with ERP information.  
Managerial implications 
Our research also has important managerial implications. First, our findings show that intrinsic 
purchase motivation has a stronger influence in private than in public, whereas extrinsic purchase 
motivation has a stronger influence in public than in private. Hence, service provider using 
PWYW pricing should emphasize the intrinsic elements of their service (e.g., quality of dining 
for a restaurant or the quality of personal training for a fitness gym) to customers who are alone 
or making the payments on their own in order to encourage such consumers to pay more. In 
contrast, for customers who are with others (e.g., colleagues, friends or family), it may be a good 




restaurant or getting a toned body by exercising in the gym, possibly by displaying pictures and 
testimonials from satisfied, happy and smiling customers.  
We also found that altruistic motivations have a stronger impact on the prices paid by the 
customers when there is a charitable outcome (e.g., a voluntary donation by the seller from the 
money paid by the customers) attached with the service, in public than in private. Hence, PWYW 
sellers could associate with social and charitable causes to in order to motivate their customers to 
pay more for their services, especially when their services are usually consumed in public, such 
as cafes, restaurants etc. PWYW businesses can also display names of regular patrons on their 
websites as such public visibility may encourage customers to pay more (Andreoni and Petrie, 
2004). Finally, we show that the interaction between social visibility and purchase motivation is 
stronger in the absence of ERP than in its presence. Hence, firms using PWYW pricing should 
exercise caution in providing external price references especially when customers ask how much 
others had paid for the same product or service (e.g., Machado and Sinha, 2012), because this 
may have an attenuating effect on the prices paid by them or even make some of them decide not 
to purchase (Gneezy et al., 2010). In this context, it would be useful to direct the attention of the 
customers towards the intrinsic benefits of the product or service when the payment is being 
made in private and the extrinsic or altruistic benefits when the payment is being made in public.  
Limitations and future research 
Our research has a few limitations that may be addressed in future research. First, we used the 
same fitness gym setting in both our studies in order to be consistent and to replicate our results 
using different study designs to manipulate ERP as a within-subjects variable in study one and as 




findings to other products and services, hence future research may test our model in other 
research settings that have been used in prior research, such as café, restaurant and cinema (Kim 
et al., 2009). Second, in both our studies we control for variables such as involvement, price 
consciousness and social desirability because these were found to have an impact on consumers’ 
PWYW pricing decisions in past research. However, there are other variables such as altruism, 
fairness, satisfaction and loyalty that were used in some studies; hence future research could 
include these and other relevant variables (e.g., self-image, personal values and cultural 
orientations) to further investigate the mechanisms underlying pricing decisions under the impact 
of purchase motivation and social visibility. Third, we operationalize social visibility through 
friends in both our studies, which may limit the generalizability of our results. Hence, future 
studies may manipulate this variable with colleagues, family members and even strangers, in 
order to tap into a wider range of familiarity. Further, our measure of internal reference price 
could have been influenced by subjects’ PTP, as this was recorded immediately after participants 
reported their prices for the PWYW offer. Future research may create a separation between these 
two measurements in order to ensure their independence from each other. Finally, in a recent 
study on the impact of ERP, Johnson and Cui (2013) show that minimum and maximum prices 
have a negative influence on prices but a suggested price strategy helps the PWYW firms 
maximize their yield. Hence, future research may also explore the influence of different levels of 
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Table I. Samples composition (demographics) 
 
Demographics Study 1 (N=124) Study 2 (N=435) 
Gender   
Male 59 (47.6%) 238 (54.7%) 
Female 65 (52.4%) 197 (45.3%) 
   
Age   
< 21 years 32 (25.8%) NA 
21-30 years 78 (62.9%) 91 (20.9%) 
31-40 years 9 (7.3%) 89 (20.5%) 
41-50 years 5 (4.0%) 86 (19.8%) 
51-60 years NA 86 (19.8%) 
> 60 years NA 83 (19.1%) 
   
Monthly Income   
<= $1000 83 (66.9%) 98 (22.5%) 
$1001- $2000 35 (28.2%) 107 (24.6%) 
$2001- $3000 6 (4.8%) 61 (14.0%) 
$3001- $4000 NA 64 (14.7%) 
$4001- $5000 NA 56 (12.9%) 
> $5000 NA 49 (11.3%) 
   
Occupation   
Unemployed NA 58 (13.3%) 
Part-time employed NA 83 (19.1%) 
Full-time employed NA 133 (30.6%) 
Self/Business NA 37 (8.5%) 
Retired NA 61 (14.0%) 
Housewife NA 34 (7.8%) 
Student 124 (100.0%) NA 
Others NA 29 (6.7%) 
   
Gym Membership   
No NA 203 (46.7%) 
Yes NA 232 (53.3%) 
   
Gym Usage   
Never NA 227 (52.2%) 
Rarely NA 59 (13.6%) 
Occasionally NA 35 (8.0%) 
Sometimes NA 26 (6.0%) 
Often NA 32 (7.4%) 
Frequently NA 49 (11.3%) 
Regularly NA 7 (1.6%) 




Table II. Scales summary (Study 1)  
 Scale Items λ α M SD 
 Intrinsic purchase motivation     
 I think working out in this gym will help me -      
INT1       … improve my fitness. 0.75 0.56 5.52 1.16 
INT2       … gain strength.  0.81 0.66 5.28 1.21 
INT3       … build stamina.  0.79 0.62 5.09 1.22 
INT4       … lose weight.  0.57 0.33 5.16 1.41 
 Extrinsic purchase motivation     
 I think working out in this gym will help me -      
EXT1       … get back in shape.  0.79 0.64 5.44 1.16 
EXT2       … look good. 0.71 0.50 5.23 1.31 
EXT3       … improve my appearance.   0.76 0.57 5.14 1.41 
EXT4       … get a toned body.  0.76 0.57 5.18 1.25 
 Involvement      
INV1 I work out in a gym regularly.  0.81 0.65 3.70 1.93 
INV2 I am very familiar with working out in a gym.   0.94 0.89 4.45 1.93 
INV3 I am very knowledgeable about working out in a gym. 0.97 0.94 4.15 1.86 
INV4 I can give people advice about working out in a gym. 0.85 0.72 3.62 1.88 
INV5 I am able to judge about the quality facilities in a gym. 0.83 0.68 4.16 1.98 
INV6 Working out in a gym is an important part of my 
lifestyle. 
0.78 0.61 3.69 1.91 
 Price Consciousness     
PCO1 Before I buy a product, I often check the prices at 
different retailers to obtain the best benefits. 
0.44 0.19 5.65 1.25 
PCO2 I usually purchase items on sale only. 0.77 0.59 4.33 1.68 
PCO3 I usually purchase the cheapest item. 0.85 0.65 4.00 1.61 
 Social Desirability     
SDR1 There have been occasions when I took advantage of 
someone. 
0.50 0.25 3.86 1.59 
SDR2 I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 0.75 0.56 4.25 1.36 
SDR3 I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and 
forget. 
0.76 0.58 3.84 1.65 
PTP1 Price to be paid 1 (AU$ - Australian Dollars) -- -- 13.49 13.23
IRP Internal reference price (AU$ - Australian Dollars) -- -- 22.68 20.89
PTP2 Price to be paid 2 (AU$ - Australian Dollars) -- -- 10.43 9.71 
(λ=factor loading, α=squared multiple correlation, M=mean, SD=standard deviation) 




Table III. Correlations table (Study 1) 
Constructs INT EXT INV PCO SDR PTP1 IRP PTP2
Intrinsic Motivation (INT) 1.00 - -  -  -  -  -  - 
Extrinsic Motivation (EXT) .59*** 1.00 -  -  -  -  -  - 
Involvement (INV) .23** .18* 1.00 -  -  -  -  - 
Price Consciousness (PCO) -.17 -.06 -.01 1.00 -  -  -  - 
Social Desirability (SDR) -.03 -.11 .13 -.04 1.00 -  -  - 
Price to be paid 1 (PTP1) -.14 .00 -.20* .07 .03 1.00 - - 
Internal Reference Price (IRP) -.07 -.03 -.30** .17 .01 .50*** 1.00 - 
Price to be paid 2 (PTP2) .04 .11 .02 .05 .10 .35** .27** 1.00 
Composite Reliability .80 .87 .95 .80 .76 NA NA NA 
Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE) 
.57 .54 .75 .66 .57 NA NA NA 




Table IV. Three-way Mixed ANOVA results (Study 1) 
 
 
ERP Absent  
(Dependent Variable = RATIO1) 
 ERP Present 






























































Table V. Scales summary (Study 2) 
 Scale Items λ α M SD 
 Intrinsic purchase motivation     
 I would take this special offer to:     
INT1       … improve my fitness for myself. 0.88 0.78 4.64 1.816 
INT2       … gain strength for myself. 0.89 0.80 4.58 1.833 
INT3       … gain stamina for myself.  0.95 0.91 4.64 1.813 
INT4       … gain a toned body for myself. 0.94 0.88 4.50 1.852 
 Extrinsic purchase motivation     
 I would take this special offer to:     
EXT1       … make a good impression on my friends. 0.93 0.86 3.35 1.817 
EXT2       … look good to my friends.  0.95 0.91 3.36 1.814 
EXT3       … impress my friends. 0.93 0.86 3.29 1.861 
EXT4       … improve how I look to my friends. 0.90 0.81 3.45 1.840 
 Altruistic purchase motivation     
 I would take this special offer to:     
ALT1       … make a useful contribution to society.  0.83 0.69 4.34 1.909 
ALT2       … support a charitable cause for the society.  0.94 0.87 4.59 1.904 
ALT3       … help other people in the society.  0.94 0.88 4.50 1.902 
ALT4       … do something good for the society. 0.95 0.90 4.53 1.895 
 Involvement      
INV1 I work out in a gym regularly.  0.77 0.59 2.53 1.786 
INV2 I am very familiar with working out in a gym.   0.84 0.71 3.43 2.006 
INV3 I am very knowledgeable about working out in a gym. 0.84 0.70 3.33 1.922 
INV4 I can give people advice about working out in a gym. 0.82 0.67 3.00 1.890 
INV5 I am able to judge about the quality facilities in a gym. 0.93 0.86 3.48 1.974 
INV6 
Working out in a gym is an important part of my 
lifestyle. 
0.75 0.57 2.86 1.915 
 Price Consciousness     
PCO1 
Before I buy a product, I often check the prices at 
different retailers to obtain the best benefits. 
0.40 0.16 5.10 1.479 
PCO2 I usually purchase items on sale only. 0.89 0.80 4.33 1.628 
PCO3 I usually purchase the cheapest item. 0.71 0.50 4.18 1.658 
 Social Desirability     
SDR1 
There have been occasions when I took advantage of 
someone. 
0.75 0.56 3.64 1.673 
SDR2 I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 0.85 0.73 3.37 1.750 
SDR3 
I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and 
forget. 
0.37 0.14 4.83 1.460 
PTP Price to be paid (AU$ - Australian Dollars) -- -- 18.70 19.25 
IRP Internal reference price (AU$ - Australian Dollars) -- -- 29.14 23.54 
(λ=factor loading, α=squared multiple correlation, M=mean, SD=standard deviation) 




Table VI. Correlations table (Study 2) 
 
Constructs INT EXT ALT INV PCO SDR PTP IRP 
Intrinsic Motivation (INT) 1.00 - -  -  -  -  -  - 
Extrinsic Motivation (EXT) .38*** 1.00 -  -  -  -  -  - 
Altruistic Motivation (ALT) .62*** .38*** 1.00 -  -  -  -  - 
Involvement (INV) .38*** .47*** .31*** 1.00 -  -  -  - 
Price Consciousness (PCO) .24** .17** .18** .16** 1.00 -  -  - 
Social Desirability (SDR) .37*** .38*** .28** .40** .38** 1.00 -  - 
Price to be paid (PTP) .13** .29** .17** .18** -.01 .07 1.00 - 
Internal Reference Price (IRP) .08 .16** .09* -.02 -.03 .04 .60*** 1.00 
Composite Reliability (CR) .95 .96 .95 .93 .78 .78 NA NA 
Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE) 
.83 .86 .84 .68 .65 .64 NA NA 




Table VII. Three-way between-subjects ANOVA results (Study 2) 
 
Dependent Variable = RATIO (PTP/IRP) 
 




































































































Note: Figures in each cell shows the average value of RATIO and its standard deviation. 
 
